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INTRODUCTION

I did not anticipate the ambivalence I felt after Gonzales v. Carhart.1 The
decision, which affirmed the constitutionality of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003,2 was at once both shocking 3 and completely expected. First, I was
shocked by what I saw as the Supreme Court's willingness to affirm the pro-life
movement's betrayal of women who, at least in the pregnancy at issue, are pro-life.4
As a student in my reproductive rights seminar pointed out, "These women were
planning to give birth. They had the baby's room ready and decorated, but
something went terribly wrong-a tragic thing that no one saw coming. 5 This
reading of Gonzales interprets the decision as showing the willingness of pro-life

* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. Thank you to the staff of
the South CarolinaLaw Review and especially Kristina Cooper and James Sullivan for making this
symposium one of the best discussions on constitutional jurisprudence I have attended in a long while.
This Article benefited enormously from symposium participants Professors Ann Bartow, Eboni Nelson,
Osamudia James, and Caitlin Borgmann. In ways too numerous to list, Kweku Toure always helps to
make my work in this area and me more thoughtful.
1. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007) (affirming the constitutionality of the Federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004)).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1531.
3. I count the Court's graphic description of the procedure, see id. at 1620 23, and the lack of
deference to the good faith and professionalism of doctors, see id. at 1622 23, 1631 32, chief among
the ways in which the opinion was shocking.
4. These women are those (1) who do not plan on aborting their pregnancies but encounter some
complication that leads to that decision; (2) whose attending physician would prescribe the use of a
technique disallowed under the Act to terminate the pregnancy; and (3) who do not qualify under the
Act's maternal health exception, see 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (a)(Supp. IV 2004). While the Court's decision
also affects those women who merely desire to terminate a pregnancy in the later stages of gestation in
a manner disallowed under the Act, such a discussion is outside the scope of this Article.
5. D.D., a brilliant third-year law student, is also the mother of a two-year-old son.
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forces to seek to limit abortion access at all costs, notwithstanding the consequences
to women-even some with potentially pro-life leanings.
Certainly, this observation does not consider the circumstances of conception
or that some of the women seeking to terminate their pregnancy in the late stages
may have been planning to have their babies adopted, for example; the fact that
these women are in the late stages of gestation suggests that the circumstances that
led them to consider the late-term termination were dire and undesired. There is
precious little background information explaining the pro-life movement's apparent
shift in focus from abortions resulting from unintended or undesirable pregnancies,
to abortions that are medically prescribed well into gestation. Even less is known
as to whether the pro-life movement will experience a backlash for its position
against those whose circumstances bring them under the restrictions of Gonzales.6
On the other hand, Gonzales represents business as usual in that it continues to
show the Court's willingness to limit women's power and right to decide with their
doctors the matters related to terminating their pregnancies. Many argue that the
chipping away of rights established in Roe v. Wade7began almost immediately after
the Court handed down that decision.8 From such a perspective, Gonzales was
hardly a surprise. Yet, Gonzales may lead to an unanticipated impact on poor
women. The reproductive rights movement has continually overlooked the interests
of poor women; as such, poor women continue to have particular vulnerabilities
under the reproductive rights doctrine.
It is the objective of this Article to move beyond ambivalence, both in order to
focus on the extent to which Gonzales can be understood within its appropriate
juris-political context and in an effort to glean guidance as to what lies ahead in the
fight for reproductive freedom. Part 11 of this Article analyzes the Gonzales
decision. By exploring the specific issues taken on by the Court, one can more
easily understand its doctrinal implications. Part II next places Gonzales within the
political context of the mainstream reproductive rights movement. Part 11 also
examines the ways in which Gonzales flows directly from the political context that
gave rise to Roe and its progeny. Part III describes the potential class implications
of the early reproductive rights movement. Part IV involves a shift from the
mainstream reproductive rights movement and the doctrine it created to a critique
of the movement's marginalization of class considerations. Specifically, Part IV
examines the class critique of the reproductive rights movement in order to
establish that Gonzales fits well within the line of cases following Roe that affect
poor women's access to abortion in distinct and profound ways.

6. While this observation warrants further inquiry into the motivations and allegiances of the prolife movement, doing so is beyond the scope of this Article.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Julia L. Ernst, Laura Katzive & Erica Smock, The Global Patternof U.S. Initiatives
CurtailingWomen's Reproductive Rights:A Perspectiveon the IncreasinglyAnti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 753 ("[S]ince 1973, a vocal anti-choice movement within the United States has
chipped away atthe core of the principles espoused by Roe."); Melanie D. Price, The Privacy Paradox:
The Divergent Paths of the United States Supreme Court and State Courts on Issues of Sexuality, 33
IND. L. REv. 863, 870 (2000) ("Legal scholars immediately criticized Roe for its activist interpretation
of the Constitution and [Roe] has remained under near constant attack from all levels of government
as municipalities, states, and Congress have sought to enact regulations that chip away ata wom[a]n's
right to procure an abortion.").
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This Article concludes in Part V by suggesting that a deeper inspection into the
history of class politics surrounding the reproductive rights movement portends
what lies ahead following Gonzales. In particular, reproductive health advocates
will undoubtedly witness Gonzales's disproportionately negative impact on poor
women in the form of further decreased access to abortion doctors, increased
surveillance of doctors who receive public funding, impediments to open
communication between women and their doctors, and lessening of the resources
necessary to promote and preserve the health and well-being of poor women.
II.

GONZALES'S JURIS-POLITICAL CONTEXT

A.

The Case

The story of Gonzales v. Carhart9 has two, interrelated legislative chapters. The
first chapter begins with Stenberg v. Carhart,° in which the Court held that
Nebraska's Partial Birth Abortion Ban was unconstitutional because it "lack[ed]
any exception 'for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother""' and
"'impose[d] an undue burden on a woman's ability' to choose a D&E abortion,
thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself."'" The second
legislative chapter in the story involves the challenge to the Federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003.' 3 The pro-life movement essentially received two bites
at the apple, with the latter being the more successful of the two. As in Stenberg,4
the Gonzales Court grounded its decision firmly within the constitutional
parameters established by PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 5 yet reached a different result.' 6 Quoting Casey, the Court recognized that
the government "has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a
child.""7 The Gonzales Court arguably placed more weight on the latter
interest regardless of how tenuous the fetal life may be and all but completely
abandoned the former.
Similarly, the Court in Gonzales-unlike the Stenberg Court-seemed to treat
with suspicion the doctor's testimony as to the necessity ofthe procedure. 8 The fact
that the Act arguably does not carefully describe the restricted procedures did not
persuade the Court of its unconstitutionality. Specifically, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the Act creates an undue burden on a woman's right to
have an abortion due to lack of clarity what conduct would make doctors
performing late-term abortions culpable and the Act's propensity to prohibit

9. 127 S. Ct. 1610.
10. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
11. Id. at 929-30 (second alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
12. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004)).
14. See 530 U.S. at 929-30 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 874, 879).
15. 505 U.S. 833.
16. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626 39 (analyzing and upholding the Federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 under the Casey standards).
17. Id. at 1626 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See id. at 1622 23, 1631 32.
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lawful procedures. 9 According to the Court, the Act is not unconstitutionally vague
on its face because doctors of ordinary intelligence "can understand what conduct
is prohibited," and it contains safeguards against "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. 2 °
The Court further explained that the Act is not void for vagueness because it
(1) regulates and proscribes a specific procedure; (2) permits lawful procedures; (3)
requires that a doctor perform an overt act upon the fetus reaching a certain
"anatomical landmark"; and (4) requires deliberate and intentional commission of
the act after the fetus reaches the anatomical landmark. 2' Additionally, the Court
disagreed with the contention that the Act imposed an undue burden because the
restrictions it placed on second trimester abortions were overly broad.22 According
to the Court, the Act was sufficiently specific in distinguishing the culpable
conduct-intentionally killing a living fetus once it has reached the set anatomical
landmark-from the nonculpable conduct-removing the fetus in pieces or
unintentionally engaging in the proscribed conduct.23
Finally, the Court rejected the claim that the Act is unconstitutional because it
does not contain an exception for the health of the mother.24 The Court stated that
this facial challenge was inappropriate because the challenge concerned the lack of
an exception to the proscribed conduct.25 Accordingly, the Court stated,
In these circumstances the proper means to consider exceptions
is by as-applied challenge[s]. The Government has acknowledged
that preenforcement, as-applied challenges to the Act can be
maintained. This is the proper manner to protect the health of the
woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined
instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which
the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.26
Additionally, the Court held that "[n]o as-applied challenge need be brought if the
prohibition in the Act threatens a woman's life because the Act already contains a
life exception. 27

19. See id at 1627-39.
20. See id.at 1628 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
21. See id at 1627-28.
22. See id. at 1629 32.
23. See id. at 1629 31.
24. See id at 1635-37.
25. See id at 1638.
26. Id. (internal citation omitted).
27. Id. at 1639 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. IV 2004)). The Court's reasoning here is
arguably circular. According to the Court, when dealing with exceptions, an as-applied challenge is
proper unless the exception is explicit. However, an explicit exception requires a facial challenge, which
would in turn lose because the exception exists in the Act.
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The Doctrine

Abortion rights proponents and opponents alike would likely contend that
Gonzales represents the first major decision on abortion since Casey,28 where the
Court created the "undue burden" standard for pre-viability restrictions on
abortion.29 In many ways, this assessment of the import of Gonzales is accurate in
that it is the modern version of Casey-it creates new law by placing the state's
interest in protecting fetal life on par with, if not higher than, the state's interest in
protecting the health of women. It also builds upon or remedies what the Casey
Court saw as Roe's undervaluing of the state's interest in protecting potential lives
of fetuses by arguably lessening the state's obligation to protect a woman's health.
Yet, Gonzales began long before Casey. According to Eileen Kaufman,
Gonzales's roots can be traced back to Roe, where the Court established that a
woman has a fundamental right to be free from governmental infringement prior to
viability and that a state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling
upon viability." However, Casey's essential principles become the organizing
framework for the Gonzales decision.' Without Casey, it is difficult to see,
particularly at first glance, how the Court could have struck the ostensible balance
between the state's interest in protecting the life of a fetus and protecting a
woman's health.
C. The PoliticalBackground
Notwithstanding the fact that Gonzales arises out of a political context that in
many ways predates Roe, the issue of abortion is the cause c~lbbre of the modern
reproductive rights movement and has Roe as its hallmark case. Reproductive rights
in the mainstream movement's political discourse equals abortion and abortion
equals reproductive rights. With its highly-charged constitutional, moral, religious,
and political implications, the abortion debate generates political unrest reminiscent
of that surrounding slavery in the nineteenth century. 2 As with the slavery debate,

28. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (affirming Roe's
recognition of a woman's right to choose to terminate a fetus prior to viability and obtain an abortion
without undue influence from the state; the state's legitimate interest in restricting termination of
pregnancies involving viable fetuses: and that at all times the state has an interest in protecting the
health of a pregnant woman and "the life of a fetus that may become a child").
29. See id. I actually disagree with this proposition, believing instead that the Court established
the undue burden standard in Maher v. Roe. See 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) ("[T]he right [to abortion]
protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy.").
30. See Eileen Kaufman, CivilRights andRelatedDecisions,23 TOURO L. REV. 855, 870 (2008)
(discussing Gon ales's relationship to Casey as well as its future implications for abortion rights).
31. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626-39.
32. Interestingly, the abortion rights campaign grew out of the civil rights movement ofthe 1950s
and 1960s. See EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS: RoE v. WADE AND ITS
AFTERMATH 30 (1982) ("The dramatic victory in Brown made it apparent to... special-interest groups
with good causes that litigation might offer benefits and a chance of success denied them by the
legislative process.").
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the issues have become solidified into a dichotomous framework summed up by the
question, "Which side are you on?" 3
However, the traditional story of abortion in the United States has a more
extensive narrative than the modern debate represents. In fact, the twentieth century
abortion issue was initially constructed after World War II. 4 At that time, more
American women than ever before- 16.5 million-worked outside of the home;
"that number was increasing by approximately one million each year, despite
postwar reconversion policies that aimed to eliminate huge numbers of women
from the workplace.""5 In an effort to reentrench the standard of the "modelwoman"-the stay-at-home wife and mother-public discussions and popularcultural representations that defined "acceptable" behavior for the "fairer sex" were
common.36 Women who had experienced paid employment during the war
responded to this push for redomestication by taking a more aggressive stance
toward reproductive rights." Their position in turn provoked mainstream
disapproval of the growing number of women seeking abortions, as reflected in
state enforcement of stringent anti-abortion statutes. 8
As early as the 1960s, it was clear that the fight against anti-abortion statutes
and the fight for access to sterilization would greatly influence the political agenda
for women who wanted to work in paid labor and not become mothers.3 9 Indeed,
positioning abortion alongside women's interest in increasing their options in the
labor force facilitated strong alliances within the fledgling, second-wave women's
movement.40 Under this broader construction, the abortion rights movement gained
relevance to lesbians in the sexual liberation movement and to blacks and Latinos
in the civil rights movement. 4 While many embraced this expanded vision of
reproductive rights,42 abortion became the single issue for much of the mainstream

33. See

BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON, OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE: TOWARD A NEW ETHIC OF

ABORTION 185-86 (1983). Specifically, Harrison noted,

To oppose legal abortion is to define women as child-bearers rather than
autonomous human beings, and to endorse a sexually repressive morality enforced
by the state. Often at a particular historical moment an issue emerges that
illuminates the nature of the larger struggle. It is the sort of issue that precludes
neutrality, that despite its ambiguities and complexities (and there always are
some), poses that most basic of political questions-which side are you on?
Id. (quoting Ellen Willis, Commentary, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 31 -Jan. 6, 1981, at 28).
34. See Rickie Solinger, Introduction to ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE,
1950 2000, at 1, 5 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
35. Id. at 5-6.
36. See Rickie Solinger, Pregnancy and Power Before Roe v. Wade, 1950 1970, in ABORTION
WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, supra note 34, at 15, 17.
37. See Solinger, supra note 34, at 6.
38. See Solinger, supra note 36, at 18-19.
39. See id. at 17.
40. See id. at 19.
41. See generally JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2003) (exploring the relationship between the movement for increased abortion rights and
other feminist movements that focused on an array of agendas).
42. For example, organizations such as the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, a group of
women from Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts, published Women and Their Bodies: A
Course-latercalled Our Bodies, Ourselves. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR
BODIES, OURSELVES: A BOOK BY AND FOR WOMEN (2d ed. 1976). The Boston Women's Health Book
Collective has been quite successful in disseminating information regarding various aspects ofwomen's
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reproductive health movement.4 3 Despite consistent pleas for a broader focus in the
movement-one that urged stressing self-help and attempting to raise awareness
about other aspects of women's health44-the mainstream movement made the
political and strategic decision to focus on abortion."
Consequently, the concentration of resources and energy paid off when, in
1973, the Supreme Court granted constitutional protection to a woman's decision
to terminate a pregnancy.46 This decision appeared to have successfully validated
the fight for reproductive autonomy for women. According to Sarah Weddington,
the attorney who represented "Jane Roe," the Roe decision was supposed to be the
floor upon which other rights could logically be supported.4
As events unfolded, however, the reproductive rights movement had little
opportunity to explore or establish those other rights. Instead, the movement has
become largely preoccupied with reacting to the so-called right-to-life movement,48
including mainstream politicians, Christian fundamentalist organizations, and
extremist groups such as Operation Rescue.4 9 The right-to-life movement's primary
objectives entail recriminalizing abortion, making it inaccessible, or both."0 To
accomplish their objectives, these organizations employ a range of techniques from

court battles to what is essentially terrorism." Facing such obstacles and aggressive
attacks on the right to abortion-including the murder of abortion providers-the
reproductive rights movement has had a difficult time moving on to a broader
spectrum of reproductive issues. Therefore, despite the debates within the ranks as
to whether abortion should continue to be a single-focus issue,5 3 mainstream

reproductive rights advocates largely view defending the gains of Roe as the
primary purpose of the movement.54
In addition to the Court's articulation of the rights and interests established in

Roe,55 pro-choice feminist activists and theorists maintained a complex relationship

health including aging, self image, economic development, and political involvement. See id
43. See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM
IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 51 54 (1991).
44. See id. at 44.
45. See id at 51 54. The women's movement was in full swing during the late 1960s and its
influence on the focus and strategies during the prelegalization period is undeniable. In fact, leaders of
the women's movement were also heading the most powerful abortion rights organizations. Id.
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
47. Interview with Sarah Weddington, Attorney for "Jane Roe," in Long Beach, Cal. (Feb. 27,
1997).
48. For an example of this kind of reaction to the right-to-life movement, see Marcy J. Wilder,
The Rule ofLaw, the Rise of Violence, andthe Role of Morality: ReframingAmerica'sAbortion Debate,
inABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, supra note 34, at73.
49. See id. at 82 84.
50. See id. at 82-85.
51. See id.
52. See id.at 81 86.
53. For an argument in support of a broader focus, see Marlene Gerber Fried, Transforming the
Reproductive Rights Movement: The Post-Webster Agenda, inFROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM: TRANSFORMING A MOVEMENT 1, 12-14 (Marlene Gerber Fried ed., 1990).
54. JANET HADLEY, ABORTION: BETWEEN FREEDOM AND NECESSITY, at xiv (1996). Their
attention is not altogether misplaced as Roe has undergone several limitations since its pronouncement
of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. See cases cited infra note 57.
55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Th[e] right of privacy... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
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with the decision. On one hand, most pro-choice feminists interested in sexual
freedom, civil and economic rights, and reproductive healthcare undoubtedly
recognized the enormity and importance of abortion decriminalization. On the other
hand, they must have also experienced Roe as somewhat of a hollow victory in that
it only spoke to the narrow issue of abortion. 56 Further, pro-choice critics of Roe
have argued that the case-and the political movement that gave rise to the
case-reflected the priorities of (1) middle and upper class women, many of whom
could already afford legal abortions in this country or abroad, and (2) women, the
majority of whom were privileged and white, who had not been subjected to
sterilization abuse. On both fronts, race and class figured prominently in the
critique. 7
Of particular relevance to this discussion of the implications of Gonzales is the
fact that the modern reproductive rights movement and its doctrine have
consistently garnered substantial class critiques. 8 One such area of critique
surrounds the post-Roe abortion-funding cases.5 9 Certainly, these cases are of
profound importance due to their impact on the reproductive realities of women
who require government funding in order to make their right to an abortion
meaningful. However, the negative class implications ofthe efforts to decriminalize
abortion actually predate Roe.6 ° Given the reproductive and sterilization abuses of
poor women dating back to slavery, 6 the decision to focus substantial resources on

56. Marlene Gerber Fried, Abortion in the United States Legal but Inaccessible, in ABORTION
WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950 2000, supra note 34, at 219 (discussing the continued
implications of the post-Roe narrowing of the feminist agenda).
57. See, e.g., Angela Hooten, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing
MainstreamandLatinaFeminism, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 59, 65 (2005) (discussing the
critique of Roe on race and class grounds); Melanie M. Lee, Comment, Defining the Agenda: A New
Strugglefor African-American Women in the Fightfor Reproductive Self-Determination,6 WASH. &
LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 87 (2000) (discussing the reproductive rights agenda for AfricanAmerican women).
58. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Poverty andRights: A Pre-MillennialTriptych, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 399, 404 (2002) (questioning the application of the reproductive rights
doctrine to the needs of poor women); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J.
GENDER&L. 119, 120, 136 37(1992) (recognizing the negative experiences ofpoor women underRoe
created by courts' and advocates' failure to take privacy seriously); Dorothy Roberts, PunishingDrug
Addicts Who Have Babies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1460-62 (discussing at length the ways in which
the reproductive rights movement and doctrine overlook poor women).
59. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) ("[T]he State's decision
here to use public facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over abortion 'places no governmental
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy. "' (quoting Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) ("[W]e find no constitutional
violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital
services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions."); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) ("[T]he right [created by Roe] protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and
to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.").
60. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Ghost ofAbortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action, 1
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 311-12 (1994) (noting that prior to Roe, poor women found it difficult to
get their issues addressed in the abortion rights movement).
61. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 22-103 (1997) (providing a historical discussion of the regulation of black
women's reproductive autonomy since slavery).
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abortion decriminalization betrayed not only the history of slavery but also the
history of the eugenics movement where thousands of women-mainly poor
women-were forcibly sterilized. 2 As the following Part of this Article discusses,
the impact of not fully integrating class into the forefront of the reproductive rights
movement not only makes the consequences of Gonzales inevitable, but also
forever limits the potential for a broadly-construed, inclusive notion of reproductive
rights.
111.

GONZALES'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOCTRINE'S CLASS CONFLICT

A comprehensive assessment of Gonzales's class implications in the
reproductive rights context must begin with Skinner v. Oklahoma. 3 In Skinner, the
Court struck down the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which
permitted the sterilization of criminals convicted of more than one felony involving
moral turpitude. 4 The lower court had ordered Skinner to undergo a vasectomy
after he was twice convicted for robbery with a firearm, following an earlier
conviction of stealing chickens.6" The Court held that the sterilization order
offended the Constitution because the statute unequally treated offenders who had
committed crimes of the same ilk. 6 For example, a person convicted of grand
larceny three times would be subject to sterilization under the Act, while a person
convicted of embezzling three times would not.67 There was nothing to distinguish
embezzlement from larceny beyond the class of the offender; it was this distinction
that the Court found unacceptable. 8
The Court both accepted and elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to the statute, finding that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause.69
The Court noted that the Act "la[id] an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilize[d] one and not the other."7
The Court articulated the importance of reproduction in continuing "the race," and
announced the breakthrough conclusion that infringement on reproductive
capacities violates the Fourteenth Amendment." It is unclear exactly what Justice
Douglas was referring to when he wrote "the race." What is clear is that Justice
Douglas's reference would have been clear had he not changed his original draft,
which stated the following: "The classification hardly has firmer constitutional
basis than if in dealing with particular offenses it drew a line between rich and poor
or between Nordic and other racial types."72 Notwithstanding the race question,
given the historical context within which Skinner was decided, Douglas makes clear

62. See id. at 89-98.
63. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
64. Id.at 536, 538.
65. Id. at 537.
66. See id. at 541.
67. Id. at 538 39.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 538.
70. See id. at 541.
71. See id.
72. See Victoria F. Nourse, Making ConstitutionalDoctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
1401, 1441 n. 180 (1997) (quoting William 0. Douglas, Draft of Opinion in Skinner (n.d.) (unpublished
draft, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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his meaning when he writes, "The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle,
far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear."73
Skinner remains the foundational decision of reproductive rights legal
doctrine,74 although its more progressive insights are no longer referenced when its
holding is cited.75 In Skinner, the Court made clear that reproduction raises
important issues of human rights and went on, in effect, to launch a reproductive
rights legal doctrine that focused on matters so fundamental to personhood that the
government should not interfere with people's choices in those areas. 76 In
conclusion, the Court grounded its decision on the disparate impact the Oklahoma
Act would have on disfavored groups by arguing that it was as if Oklahoma, by
enacting the statute, had purposefully selected a particular class of persons for
oppressive treatment. 7 7 While Skinner is still cited in support of the reproductive
rights of women, it does not stand for the proposition that one's status as a racial
minority in general, and as a descendent of slaves in particular, bears any historical
or doctrinal relevance in the application of constitutional protection in reproductive
matters. 78
IV.

GONZALES AND THE CLASS CRITIQUE CONTINUUM

Skinner can arguably be read as evidence of the Court's recognition that the
constitutional implications of reproductive rights-including abortion-are
inextricably bound to class implications. 79 Yet, the relationship between class and
reproductive rights is without specific or explicit reference in Griswold v.
Connecticut0 or Eisenstadtv. Baird.8' However, the class implications are certainly
implicit in the holdings of these cases. First, the focus on abortion as the central
thrust of litigation is a direct result of the splits between middle- and upper-class
women who sought abortions and working-class and poor women whose
reproductive interests were more closely tied to a broader construction of

73. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
74. A. Felecia Epps, The Right Responsibility: Does the Right to ProcreateInclude the
Responsibility to Parent?, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 85, 113 (2008) ("Skinner v. Oklahoma was the first
case to recognize the existence of a right to freedom in procreation decisions." (internal footnote
omitted)).
75. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (citing Skinner
but failing to discuss the potential race-related aspects of the decision); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 547 (1989) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (same); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 54 (1972) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(same).
76. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
77. See id.
78. For a more detailed discussion of Skinner, see ROBERTS, supra note 61, at 307 08.
79. For examples of commentary finding class implications in the Skinner decision, see Peggy
Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299,
361 (1993) ("In language that carried an accusation of class bias, the Court asserted that '[s]terilization
of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with immunity for those who are embezzlers, is a
clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination. "' (quoting Skinner, 361 U.S. at 541)); and Nourse, supra
note 72, at 1439 ("Skinner is about class distinctions in criminal law ... .
80. See 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. See 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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reproductive healthcare. One can fairly assume that had poor women and women
of color had more political influence and resources within the mainstream
movement their issues would have taken center stage. Second, as Professor Darren
Lenard Hutchinson points out in his analysis of Supreme Court decisions, many of
the Court's decisions dealing with controversial topics are essentially a stamp
82
approval on how the majority of Americans have already resolved the issue.
Under Hutchinson's theory, Roe and its progeny can be understood as reifying the
prioritization of abortion in the realm of reproductive interests facing women. It
would follow, therefore, that the decisions help to push the interests more likely to
impact poor women and women of color to the margins, not only in the political
sphere but in the jurisprudential sphere as well. When class and race do arise in
cases, the Court appears justifiably obtuse or hostile to arguments that would
sensitize the doctrine to such matters.
Interestingly, when the issue of class reappeared in the jurisprudential
landscape of the modern reproductive rights doctrine, it did so in Maher v. Roe83
and Harris v. McRae8 4 _two cases that limited public funding of abortions for
women on public assistance. Therefore, Skinner's class consciousness within the
reproductive rights context is relegated to the margin-albeit an important margin.
Skinner is cited for the proposition that procreative matters are well within the zone
of privacy that the Constitution protects from governmental intrusion." Maher and
Harris,however, establish that denying public funding for abortions sought by poor
women is not an intrusion or undue burden on women seeking to exercise their
right to an abortion.86
Not only does Gonzales continue a history of political and jurisprudential
limitations on the interests set forth in Roe, but it also further implicates class in
reproductive rights. In that respect, Gonzales extends the reach of the so-called
"Hyde Amendment," which sets the parameters for using federal Medicaid
resources for abortion procedures." Like Gonzales, the Hyde Amendment restricts
funding to situations where the life of the mother is at stake.88 Also like Gonzales,
the Hyde Amendment evolved from Roe's initial articulation of maternal health as
an important trigger for abortion funding.89 As of 1991, several states had similarly

82. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and
Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (2005).
83. 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding a state prohibition on the use of public funding for
abortions not necessary to protect the health or life of the mother).
84. 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (holding that states that participate in Medicaid are not required to
fund medically necessary abortions even though the Hyde Amendment makes reimbursement
impossible).
85. E.g., id. at 312 n.18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 471 72, 472 n.7.
86. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 326; Maher, 432 U.S. at 480.
87. The original Hyde Amendment was passed by Congress in 1976 as part of an appropriations
bill for the U.S. Department of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare. See Department of Labor
Appropriation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). However,
subsequent Congresses appended similar provisions to other appropriations bills. See, e.g., Department
of Labor Appropriation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 204, 96 Stat. 1830, 1894 (1982) (prohibiting
the use of federal funds "to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term"). The term Hyde Amendment has come to refer to any such funding
amendment. See Harris,448 U.S. at 302.
88. Department of Labor Appropriation Act of 1977, § 209, 90 Stat. at 1434.
89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
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restricted public funds for women seeking abortions. 90 At present, seventeen states
provide public funding for abortions when a treating physician deems the procedure
medically necessary. 9' While "medical necessity" can be construed narrowly to
exclude psychiatric or other mental healthj ustifications, there is room to argue that
it is broad enough to include maternal health and by extension, nonmedical health
issues, in addition to situations where the life of the woman is at stake.
Gonzales, however, all but forecloses this possible extension by failing to
require that state restrictions on abortion include an explicit maternal health
exception. 92 Gonzales goes further by casting doubt on the success of an as-applied
challenge to the lack of a maternal health exception because the Act contains an
exception for situations where the life of the mother is at stake. 93 This aspect of the
Court's holding takes its cue directly from the shift from a focus on maternal health
exceptions to life exceptions found in the funding context. One cannot help but hold
up the success of the shift in the funding context as an essential factor in the Court's
holding in Gonzales. The intriguing proposition is that the mainstream abortion
rights movement is arguably as responsible for this aspect of Gonzales as much as
the pro-life movement and the new composition of the Court. While little is gained
by pointing fingers, there is much to be gained by not only examining the
correlation between the dynamics and the development of the doctrine but also
examining the potential cross-purposes of those dynamics.
V.

CONCLUSION

While I agree that Carhartwill be "oceanic" in its significance94 within the
juris-political landscape of the modern reproductive rights doctrine, I believe poor
women will most heavily feel its impact. Poor women, who are disproportionately
women of color, are already struggling with issues of access to abortion due to the
funding restrictions established after Roe and the funding realities that predated
Roe. 95 Gonzales will likely exacerbate the already dire conditions facing poor
women who need or want abortions, because fewer doctors will be willing to offer
the procedures for fear of criminal indictment. Additionally, doctors who provide
reproductive services in public facilities are inherently subject to greater
surveillance, and are therefore more likely than private doctors to be found in

90. Specifically, thirty states-Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah-and the District of Columbia-restrict the use
of state Medicaid funds for abortion to only cases of life-threatening pregnancy. See Rachel Benson
Gold & Daniel Daley, Public Funding of Contraceptive, Sterilization and Abortion Services, Fiscal
Year 1990, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 209, 210 tbl.3 (1991).
91. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF APRIL 1,2008: STATE FUNDING
OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/

spibs/spib SFAM.pdf
92. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. CE 1610, 1637 (2007).
93. See id. at 1639 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. IV2004)).
94. Edward Lazarus, The Supreme Court's Split Decision to Uphold the Federal"PartialBirth
Abortion " Ban: Why, Despite the Court's Disclaimers,It Will Be Hugely Influential,FINDLAW, Apr.
26, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20070426.html.
95. For a discussion of the impact of funding restrictions on legal abortions, see Graber, supra
note 60, at 368 70.
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violation of the Act. It will only take a few public prosecutions or indictments of
public doctors under the Act before doctors cease performing the procedures
disallowed under the Act. Perhaps those doctors will move to the private sector,
but, undoubtedly, the indictments will follow them.
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